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The Delhi Massacre: An Example Of Malicious Government Khalsa Human Rights Group India is a vast, multi-ethnic country which before Independence in 1947 was a collection of princely states controlled by the British Administration . Independent India is a country composed of 25 States and seven Union Territories. Each State has a degree of autonomy with Central authority, based in New Delhi, controlling ministerial offices such as defence, foreign policy, and the economy. India, with a population of 850 million, contains all the major world religions, is socially divided into hundreds of castes, and has 15 major languages (as well as 47 other languages, dialects, and tribal tongues, each spoken by over 100,000 people). Although culturally diverse, the majority of the population are Hindu, almost 83%.It is the sheer size of the Hindu community that has raised fears among India's religious minorities of being overwhelmed or absorbed in a Hindu sea. In recent years Hindu fundamentalism, combined with the often intransigent religious traditions of the village, has sometimes resulted in a stringent opposition against minority religious groups in states such as Assam, Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir, Maharashtra and Nagaland. Communal strife in India has tended to be initiated or exacerbated by groups seeking political advantage in a society of scarcity. Each seeks to define its identity as a mechanism for gaining benefits for the group as a whole. Occasionally, as in the attack on a mosque in Ayodhya in 1992 (which Hindus claimed to be the birth place the god Ram and upon which the Muslims had built a mosque in the 16th c.), the severity of the communal anger surprises even the irresponsible religious and political leaders who deliberately set the communities against each other. The purpose of this report is to highlight the abuses suffered by one of the minority groups in India, the Sikhs, as represented by the Delhi Massacre of 1984. The reluctance of the government to take effective measures against the rioters tacitly condoned the violations and, in more contemporary terms, can only be interpreted as a politically motivated backing to suppress a minority religion in India. To research human rights issues in India is considerably difficult. The government prohibits visits by independent human rights organisations (such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch-Asia (HRW-A), the International Red Cross, the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, and even UN Human Rights Rapporteurs ). Because of this, the truth behind allegations is difficult to ascertain, however, reports by human rights and lawyers' organisations inside India, reports by India's National Human Rights Commission, the Indian government, newspapers, and periodicals have all been analysed to put together the following summary. The Indian government has consistently refuted many allegations that it permits violations, and it has, unconvincingly, stated that all those found to have perpetrated abuses have been quickly and sufficiently punished. Needless to say, impartial investigations by reputable organisations would be in the government's best interest, thereby reducing international concern. Two lessons can be drawn from the experience of the Delhi riots. One is about the extent of criminalisation of our politics and the other about the utter unreliability of our police force in a critical situation V.M. Tarkunde (Supreme Court of India). The Prime Minister's assassination was seized upon as an opportune psychological pretext by those bent on exploiting the tension for political and material gains, to trigger off a massive, deliberate, planned onslaught on the life, property and honour of a comparatively small, but easily identifiable, minority community. Report of the Citizens' Commission It must be noted that before writing this report, Khalsa Human Rights contacted the Indian High Commissioner, Dr. L.M. Singhvi, asking him for information about the Delhi Massacre. At the time of writing the High Commissioner has made no response. Between 1-4 November, 1984, New Delhi witnessed some of the worst rioting in India's history. Not only were gurdwaras (a Sikh temple and community centre) shops, businesses and houses looted, destroyed and burnt to the ground, but people were beaten, raped and murdered; in the majority of reported cases individuals were burnt alive. Although the number of dead has often been disputed, the government statistic of 2,733 indicates the severity of the massacre. What was unique about this riot was that the target for the mob "anger was directed at a single minority, the Sikhs. At the time it was believed that the attacks were reprisals for the assassination on 31 October of the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, by her two Sikh bodyguards. Their action was similarly seen as revenge for the attack on the Golden Temple, which Indira Gandhi sanctioned, four months earlier. Many observers, however, noted that reports of Hindus helping to protect their Sikh friends and neighbours, often risking their own lives in the process, disputed the communal nature of the attacks. Moreover, a large proportion of those who actually took part in the riots were not local but drafted in from settlements outside Delhi, many of whom were considered bandits and criminals. Finally, reported citing of local Congress (I) politicians leading the mobs as they ran through the streets, with the police casually observing (in some cases actively participating), suggested that the spontaneous outburst of Hindu anger was in fact carefully planned. In other words, what began as a communal clash between Hindus and Sikhs, revealed itself to be an orchestrated and opportunistic victimisation of a religious minority by, amongst others, the government of India. Shortly after peace was restored investigations into these allegations began. There were six official and at least four independent inquiries into the Massacre. This report by Khalsa Human Rights intends to: record the known facts about the sequence of events during October 31 and November 4; summarise the findings of the investigations; look at the particular role played by the security forces and members of the administration ; and then to examine what efforts have been made by subsequent governments to compensate the victims and to bring to justice those who participated in the Delhi Massacre. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was shot by two of her security guards and rushed to the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS). 10.00 News of the assassination first heard on the BBC. 11.00 First mention by All India Radio (AIR) of the assassination. 14.30 Evening editions of several newspapers in New Delhi carried news that Indira Gandhi had died. Crowds began gathering at the AIIMS. Stray incidents of Sikhs being harassed and assaulted first reported. The President of the Republic, Zail Singh, arrived at Palam on his return from an official visit. He drove straight to AIIMS, his entourage was stoned \tab approaching the hospital. 18.00 AlR announced the death of Indira Gandhi. Crowds went on a rampage in several parts of Delhi, particularly areas adjacent to the hospital. 18.50 Rajiv Gandhi, Indira's son, was sworn in as Prime Minister. By late evening outbreaks of violence occurred in many areas. Gurdwaras houses, shops, factories and other property belonging to Sikhs were looted and destroyed. Some Sikhs were assaulted, and reports of individuals being dragged from cars and buses. Evening transmissions of AIR and Doordarshan, the State financed television , announced that orders under Section 144 Cr. PC, prohibiting the assembly of five or more persons and the carrying of arms of all types, had been promulgated in the Union Territory of Delhi. Late in the evening, Rajiv Gandhi made a broadcast appealing for calm and the maintenance of peace. It is worth noting that both the Sikri Report and the Tarkunde Report stress that no evidence of any serious attempts on the life of Sikhs was recorded on the night of 31 October, when one would expect the spontaneous show of hatred politicians said was the cause of the killings. One incident, recorded in the Tarkunde Report, illustrates this; A Sikh youth' s turban was snatched by a small crowd of 30-35 persons [at about 16.00, 31 October]. They tossed his turban once, and jeered as it came down. They tossed it a second time and as it came down, set it ablaze. Some persons from the market came out and whisked away the youth; he was not harmed. November, 1984 The violence continued to spread and increased in intensity and brutality, especially in congested areas. The television stations focused, throughout the day, on the crowds, which included Sikhs, that had gathered to pay their respects to the assassinated leader. There were occasional interviews with members of the public. Viewers heard provocative slogans which were raised by some of the mourners (e.g. Khoon ka badla khoon se lenge blood for blood). Several member of Parliament, high-ranking citizens and many individuals were reported to have made pleas to the police for assistance in different areas. The uniform answer to virtually all pleas was that they had inadequate resources. Numerous casualties, predominately Sikh, had been admitted to hospitals. Those killed were estimated at 60 in Delhi. The army was reported to have been given shoot on sight commands in order to assist the police in controlling the disturbances. The Home Secretary, Narasimha Rao (India's current Prime Minister), was reported to have said that the situation would be brought under control by the evening of Friday, 2 November. He also said that there had been only a few clashes in which a total of ten people had been killed throughout the country. Of these, five had died in Delhi- one in police firing, three in an exchange of fire between two groups while one had been stabbed. It was also reported that the Lt. Governor of the army felt that for the present b there was no need to set up refugee camps to protect the persecuted or homeless resulting from the attacks. Indefinite curfew was imposed at 18.00. 2 November, 1984 Many reports of an increase in violence, arson, rape and murder; of Sikh passengers on trains being dragged from them and killed, and of trains approaching Delhi being forcibly stopped by crowds to enable them to attack Sikh passengers. That evening Rajiv Gandhi made a second appeal for peace. Because of the large amount of Sikhs who had been made homeless, final estimates were 50,000, relief camps were set up by volunteers. Eighteen such unofficial camps were created, the government had, as yet, not built one. 3 November, 1984 (the day of Indira Gandhi's cremation) Large contingents of police and army personnel was deployed for duties in connection with the funeral arrangements and to escort visiting foreign dignitaries. Section 144 Cr. P.C. orders were relaxed from 09.00 to 20.00. The first signs of an abatement of the violence became evident. The feared increase following the cremation was unfounded. 4 November, 1984 Isolated incidents of violence were still reported, overall, however, law and order was returning to the capital. According to official reports, 1,809 people had been arrested on charges of arson, rioting and looting. A few arrests had been made on those who violated the curfew laws. It is reported that not one person had been arrested for murder, despite the fact that the Home Secretary stated that 458 people had been killed, including 17 who had died in police firing. Non-official estimates at the time put the figure at about 1,000 dead. Case Studies The number of dead will never be known exactly, however the terrifying stories told by witnesses who lived bear testimony to a severity in numbers and brutality that is hard to imagine. Below are just two cases chosen from the many hundreds available. They have not been chosen because of the uniqueness or the excessive nature of the abuses witnessed, but because they illustrate what was the common cause of death for the majority of Sikhs, death by immolation. In both cases the witnesses wished to remain anonymous because of fears that further reprisals, even today, may be taken against family or friends still in India. Mrs. K. The late husband of this witness was a tea-stall owner. The family were originally from Alwar, but resettled in Delhi in 1977. Mrs. K' s husband and three sons (the eldest 28, was a railway porter, the second, aged 20, drove a hired scooter-rickshaw, while the third was a boy of 14), were all killed on 1 November. Mrs. K said that on 1 November, some people went around asking the shops to down shutters . Those who had closed them, returned to their homes. The pradham [official] of my block then went around calling people to assemble, as a mob was coming to burn the gurdwara. The police soon arrived and warned them all to return to their homes and to stay indoors assuring them that they would be safe. When the mob came they [the Sikh men] came out and repulsed them. Three such waves were repulsed but each time the police cam e and told them to go home and stay there. The fourth time they came in increased strength and started attacking individual homes, driving people out, beating and setting fire to the buildings. The method of killing was invariably the same: men were hit on the head, sometimes to the extent of breaking the skull, kerosene poured over them and then set on fire. Several individuals, including Mrs. K's nephew, tried to escape by cutting their hair. Despite this many were killed because they were identified by neighbours who took part in the rioting and could identify Sikhs, or by minor, lo cal officials who were seen carrying clipboards and directing the mob to attack particular households or people. Other Sikhs had their hair forcibly cut and then killed. Mrs. K. lost everything of value from her own home, including Rs. 7,000 in cash, a radio, a TV and other items. Moreover, despite being a middle-aged mother of four, I was nearly raped but was saved by providence. Nevertheless, I was repeatedly humiliated and my clothes were torn off two or three times. She added, when the stricken women rushed out of their burning homes, the gujjars (from village Chilla), bhangis and some others enquired from each other which woman they fancied and then proceeded to rape them. I heard people shouting to each other to kill every Sikh, and that even if one escaped it would be bad for them. There were twenty-one males in her father-in-law's family. All of them were killed. Her brother was beaten and left for dead but fortunately survived. Mrs. S. Mrs. S. heard of Indira Gandhi's death at about 16.00 in the afternoon. My husband came home and he told me to call my sons back home because there was going to be a disturbance in Delhi. We were watching television, we didn't know what was going to happen. Our whole family was in the house, which was in the centre of Delhi. In the morning [1 November], we were watching the television, but didn't know what was happening in Delhi. We could hear the shooting but we didn't know what was happening. But the fight was on, and the violence was increasing. We stayed in the house. At about 14.00 the mob came, about 400-500 people. They started throwing stones at the houses, including ours. So our youngest son and my husband went upstairs. The rest of my family went to the next-door neighbours to hide. The neighbours were Hindus. My husband had a revolver, it was very old. They were attacking my husband and my son. The mob came into the house, my husband told my son to run away because it wasn' t safe. My son jumped down and the mob gathered around him. They hurt him so much. They wrapped a sari around him. And then they set fire to him. The mob went upstairs to fight my husband. They killed him with a rod. He died there and then. They looted all the house and then set it on fire. I was next door hiding with the neighbours who were good friends. At about 18.00 someone saw my son's finger was moving. So they took him to the hospital. He had stitches, a lot of stitches. His back was badly burnt as well. And a broken arm. They burnt everything, and whatever they could take they took. They didn't leave anything, not even a spoon. After three days the military came. There was no sign of the Delhi police. The telephone wires were cut so we couldn't inform the police. Police couldn't do anything because they didn't come. And there was nobody to help me with the funeral of my husband' s body. We went to the camps, there was nothing left in the house. In the camps we were protected. There has been no investigation into the attacks. We reported the incidents, but no police officer has come to investigate it. I still recognise the people who did this, by their faces. I don't know their names. Three or four of them. We are still scared. At least my son is still alive. The Role Of The Police It is now an established fact that during the height of the violence in Delhi, the police not only refused to assist and protect Sikhs being hounded throughout the city, but there are recorded instances where the police were actively involved in the beatings and lootings or led the mobs in an orchestrated attack. No evidence of any serious attempts to enforce prohibitory orders either during the night of 31 October, or on the following morning, has come to our notice...The accounts furnished to the Commission do not give the least indication of the presence or active concern shown by senior police officials or others in what was happening in the affected localities...Again, based on information before us, we learn that some trouble-makers were arrested in the initial stages but there is no evidence to suggest that any systematic steps were taken to restore a sense of security or confidence amongst the residents of the several localities which were subjected to continuing outrages during these four days. Nor is there any information regarding investigations into crimes of looting, mayhem, arson, murder, rape, abduction, etc., having been undertaken. Again, there is no information of perpetrators being prosecuted. On the contrary, accusations abound of those who were initially arrested having been freed on police bail...Even those arrested for brutal killings were released by the police either on bail or, in several instances, reportedly at the intercession of some political leaders. The negative role of the police can be summarised in three categories:
and finally, covering up any evidence which would secure a conviction following the restoration of peace. The removal of weapons from Sikhs by the police underlies the thoroughness and sophistication with which the so-called mobs were actually ruled. In one incident 4 houses belonging to Sikhs were attacked, the Sikhs resisted with kirpans [ceremonial swords]. It is reported that the crowd retreated, went back to the Congress (I) office and soon the local Congress leader went rushing to the Mongolpuri Police Station to complain against the armed Sikhs. The police suddenly became active and came down. The Sikhs were arrested and were brought to the Police Station, were disarmed and ordered to go back to their homes. On the way each of them was slaughtered. The crowd by now was 400-500 strong. In another incident on 3 November the Station House Officer of Tilak Nagar Police Station arrived at a Sikh house and asked the owners to go indoors. The owners refused because they had heard stories of similar demands which resulted in the family being locked in their house and house then set on fire. The officer, after calling for reinforcements, began abusing and beating family members and even threatened one of them with a gun. They also beat a 75 year-old man and confiscated his unloaded licensed revolver which he had owned since 1944. They dragged him by his hair to th e jeep and took him to the police station, continuing to hit him with the butts of their guns. He was told to kill two Sikhs if he wanted to be free. At the police station he was locked up and again beaten to the point of bleeding and becoming unconscious . He was beaten by a Sub-Inspector (who he named) who shouted that no Sikh would be able to live in the area with his hair and beard. There are many incidences where the police turned a blind eye to the events which were happening often near police stations, but sometimes right in front of them. On the afternoon 1 November, at about 15.30, a mob of about 250-300 went to a school which has 525 pupils of whom 65% were non-Sikh. The mob first set fire to the tents and school desks. Thereafter, they demolished the boundary wall of the school, entered the building and broke open the steel cupboards and looted them. They stole the school typewriter, instruments belonging to the school band, utensils, etc. Two desks and seven steel cupboards were seen being taken away. They destroyed the library and scientific equipment in the laboratory. There were seven or eight policemen standing by who witnessed the mob's activities but did nothing to stop them. When asked to prevent the mob from damaging the school, they said they could do nothing. No arrest were reported to have been made and no action been taken. In another incident two men who, fearful of an attack on their visiting Sikh friend, went to the airport to meet him. What they witnessed was recorded by the Sikri Report. They saw a bus on fire. A little further on, they saw five taxis ablaze at a taxi stand...They saw two policemen on the way home. Both of them were unarmed. One of then was hurling stones at the Sikhs among the crowd. The other was urging people in the crowd to join in the attacks...Efforts to contact the police on the telephone were in fructuous. He saw no signs of a police presence, much less intervention. The absence of the police, according to him, emboldened the mob...That afternoon he s aw another mob looting a house in a cool and unhurried manner, without any dispute or competition among the looters. Within half-an-hour, the house had been completely ransacked and then set on fire. At about 16.00, while the looting was going on, the sir en of an approaching police vehicle was heard. This alarmed the mob who began to disperse but the vehicle just drove by and the crowd re-assembled. On 21 December, 1984, three members of the Citizen's Commission visited two areas where there had been rioting. The tales of violence were broadly similar to other accounts we had heard. The new item was that we were told that the police had fired on Sikhs who had grouped in the street for self-defence. A police officer was named who allegedly fired on a group of Sikhs and killed two men. The marks of .303 rifle bullets was found embedded in a wall. This police officer was still posted in Sultanpuri Police Station and continued to threaten and abuse Sikh residents. Another witness reported that he saw a police [official], whom he named, and two constables who had come to the area and when they saw a group of Sikhs gathered to defend themselves, the [official] shot and killed one of them. He named three local political figures as having been leaders of the aggressive mob. When the Sikhs grouped, the mob dispersed. But the police persuaded them to return to their respective homes. When they returned and locked themselves in, the mobs came again and meted out broadly similar treatment to each house. They first knocked at the door asking the inmates to come out. If they did not, the door was broken open and the inmates were dragged out. If they opened the door, they got the same treatment. They were first beaten, and sometimes knocked senseless, thereafter kerosene was poured over the individual who was then set alight. In almost all cases the neighbours did not help. Rather, they participated in the violence. As well as their involvement during the Massacre, the police have to be condemned because of their lack of sympathy and support after peace had been restored. Again, incidences of officers covering-up the violations perpetrated by their constables or offenders who have not been arrested are numerous. For instance, the first First Information Report ( FIR, a police charge sheet) was registered on 1 November, however, it was not received by the Metropolitan Magistrate until 7 November, by law it should be sent the same day. Moreover, during the period 1-11 November, the Mongolpuri Police Station only registered three FIRs, despite the fact that hundreds of criminal incidents were actually reported. When representatives from the Citizens for Democracy group visited the Narang Colony refugee camp on 16 November several Sikhs showed them copies of complaints made to the police in which they had mentioned the names and addresses of the miscreants but still the said miscreants were roaming around freely as no action was being taken against them...[Moreover], what is significant about FIRs lodged by the police themselves is that none of them mention any names of suspects or criminals as a FIR should. It is most likely that they were filed much after the incidents, so as to cover up the gross negligence of the police. This would explain why the FIRs reached the relevant Metropolitan Magistrates so late, in some cases after a week . A similar accusation was reported by the Sikri Report , ...four types of case had been registered: assault and robbery, rape, arson and murder. There has been no action so far; a few culprits who had been arrested were released within a few days and were still at large and threatening the people. No efforts had been made to recover stolen property and none had been returned to the owners. In another case study the witness said, No searches were made to recover stolen property. The police only went around the residential areas appealing to people to surrender stolen goods. While some items were recovered in this manner, not even 10% of them had been returned to the legitimate owners. Similar disrespect was shown in the way the police dealt with the bodies of those who were found dead, the bodies were not handed over to the relatives- all their requests were refused. It is still not known how their bodies were disposed of. These actions were taken deliberately, in order to minimise the number of dead reported to the public. Role Of The Administration When the police avoided protecting Sikhs in Delhi or when they took part in the actual atrocities, it appears they did so as an opportunistic response to a convenient situation. The same cannot be said for Members of Parliament, local officials and senior figures in religious and community groups. Here there was a calculated plan to inflict as much damage as the breakdown in law and order would allow. One commentator described the pre-riot organising as an enemy force preparing for battle. The involvement of senior officials can be categorised as follows: co-ordinating the attack before the arrival of the mobs; arranging for gangs to be transported to the city; and arranging materials which would be used, such as kerosene. The Tarkunde Report states, There is evidence that in several areas local Congress (I) leaders held meetings on the night of October 31, and these preceded the attacks and killings of the Sikhs, and that the Congress (I) ring leaders paid Rs.1000- to each killer; as boasted by the killers themselves who invariably used to be heavily drunk before killing. One such instance is that in Khajori-Bhajanpura (C Block)- Gamri area in Trans Yamuna. It is reported that a prominent Congress (I) leader of the locality, who is a Gujar by caste, called a meeting on the night of 31 October. [The meeting] was attended by his son xxxxx, xxxxx (kerosene depot owner), and xxxxx (Principal of a local school in Bhajanpura). [Together] they made an exhaustive list of local Sikh families who were to be attacked on November 1 by them...what happened thereafter was sheer unspeakable horror. In a space of two and a half days among the families who took refuge in Nanaksar, 155 people had been slaughtered. These numbers, which are but from a single [relief] camp, make mockery of the Government estimates of the deaths in the Capital. In Another Incident Refugees from Patarganj, Khichripur, and Kalyanpuri in Pandav Nagar Gurdwara, separately interviewed, mentioned that a cream coloured Matador owned by one xxxxx drove up to Ganesh Nagar (Pandav Nagar Complex) carrying 12 men, one of whom was xxxxx, a Congress (I) Councillor; they distributed to the crowd assembled there [bamboo sticks] revolvers and riles- which they had brought with them and were heard telling them before leaving Use these on the Sardars. A common misunderstanding of the Massacre is that it was solely of a communal nature. It is true that the victims were virtually all Sikh and that nearly all the rioters were Hindu, however, it must be stated that the rioters were often thieves and looters first. It is clear from all the reports written on the Delhi Massacre that the Hindu mobs were in fact controlled by a small group of irresponsible and politically motivated politicians and activists rather than ordinary Hindus, many of whom risked their own lives trying to protect Sikhs. The cause for much of the initial communal agitation was propaganda mischievously put about by the same officials who took part. Firstly, a rumour was spread that after Indira Gandhi' s death, Sikhs held parties and danced the bhangra. There were no incidences of this actually happening. This was followed by reports that Sikhs had poisoned the water supply to Delhi, as revenge for the attacks. Again no actual reports of this have been corroborated. Finally, that train loads of Hindus arriving in Delhi had all been killed by Sikhs. Again, no evidence supporting this allegation has been found. Whilst these rumours may have put fear into the minds of Hindus, the majority obeyed the curfew regulations, assisted in the refugee camps and quickly re-established friendly relationships with the Sikh community in the weeks after the Massacre. One final issue which has to be examined in relation to the days of the riots are the refugee camps set up to help and/or protect Sikhs fleeing from danger. It has been well documented that the government was painstakingly slow in setting up official camp s, and that by 5 November there were no less than 28 voluntary camps. Moreover, the closing down of camps happened far too quickly after the end of the Massacre. One social worker, who was working at the Shakkarpur Camp as a voluntary relief worker since 6 November, said that the water supply to the camp was cut of on 13 November, and when he asked the authorities how they would assist the inmates to return to their original homes, he was told that they would be returned in the same way by which they had been brought to the camp [i.e. through fear]. When peace was restored to Delhi there was the immediate problem of compensation for the survivors and justice for the victims. In both the authorities in Delhi were found to be ineffective and considerably reluctant to take any action. For instance, the Sikri Report states that "bank officials and/or civil servants had indulged in fraud or mischief while distributing the cheques covering the compensations stipulated by the government. Next was the issue of how much compensation should be paid: Rs. 10,000 for a death or for a completely destroyed home; Rs. 5,000 for houses substantially destroyed; Rs. 2,000 for injury; and Rs. 1,000 for minor damage to a home. It was noted by the Citizens Commission that this was woefully inadequate...[Moreover] No compensation was offered for domestic effects looted or destroyed, nor was there proportionate compensation for a larger house. The contents of shops and businesses premises have not been taken into consideration at all. Nor has any compensation been offered for loss of machinery or industrial assets or other means of livelihood with regard the large number of trucks, cars, taxis and scooters destroyed. Some initial relief or compensation should have been offered to enable survivors to resume earning their livelihood. More damaging to the conscience of the Sikh community in India, however, is the lack of subsequent justice. The residents of the area were upset with the Congress (I) whose representatives, they firmly believed, were responsible for the violence. They were even more upset that after the violence, no representative of either the Congress (I) or representatives of any other political party came to sympathise with them or give them relief. In conclusion one must analyse some facts. In eleven years since the Massacre no less than six official enquiries have made their findings public: the 1985 Ranganath Mishra Commission; the 1987 Jain-Banerjee Commission; the 1987 Kapur-Mittal Commission (w ho indicted 72 police officials); the 1990 Poti-Rosha Commission; the Jain-Aggarwal Commission (who in 1993 recommended the prosecution 298 police officers and 29 erring persons and who, like the Jain-Banerjee Commission and the Poti-Rosha Commission, included the recommendation to bring charges against two leading Delhi politicians of the Congress (I) party); and, finally, the R.S. Narula Committee established in December, 1993, by the Chief Minister of Delhi (who called for action against 72 police officials and 21 cases against others including the same Congress (I) leaders in the Jain-Aggarwal Commission). Despite this, only 15 people have been convicted in connection with 20 out of 2,733 deaths. Over 1,000 affidavits have been filed by victims. Yet none of the recommendations of these six official committees have been implemented nor have any of the accused policemen and politicians been brought to justice. In May, 1994, the Director of Prosecutions of the Delhi Administration asked that the government consider dropping the cases against the indicted policemen. |
