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Delhi
(A) General In 1912 the province of Delhi was carved out and was placed in the administrative charge of a Chief Commissioner. In 1952 Delhi became a Part 'C' State and with effect from November 1, 1956, by the Seventh Amendment Act of the Constitution, Delhi became a Union Territory and came to be administered by the President through an Administrator appointed under sub-Article (1) of Article 239 of the Constitution ---initially designated as Chief Commissioner and later Lieutenant Governor. Under Article 239A Parliament has authority by law to create, for certain Union Territories, a body to function as its legislature but Delhi is not covered and for its administration , Parliament has enacted the Delhi Administration Act, 1966, under which detailed provisions have been made for the carrying on of the administration. Section 27(3) of the Delhi Administration Act provides:
Section 30 of the Act further provides:
In consonance with the provisions of the Act , Rules of Business have been framed. Maintenance of law and order subject to the control of the Central Government is thus a matter vested in the Lt. Governor to be exercised in his discretion. On October 31, 1984, Shri P.G. Gavai was the Lt. Governor. Delhi has a Commissioner of Police as the head of the police establishment and at the relevant time Shri S.C. Tandon, IPS, held that post. The Union Territory has a large chunk of urbanised area under municipal administration and the remaining part which is rural is divided into two tehsils - Delhi and Mehrauli. The entire Union Territory is one revenue district in charge of a District Magistrate. By 1984, the Union Territory had been divided into five police districts, each being called a Range in charge of a Deputy Inspector General of Police (later, Addl. Commissioner of Police). For administrative convenience, an officer of the rank of Addl. District Magistrate came to be in charge of each of these five districts (now six - with New Delhi having become a separate unit). In October/November 1984, Shri R. S. Sethi, a member of the Indian Administrative Service, was the District Magistrate. There are several Addl. Commissioners of Police earmarked for specific purposes such as Administration, Headquarters, Range etc. Below the Deputy Commissioner of Police in every Range there are Asstt. Commissioners of Police. The Union Territory of Delhi was then divided into 63 Police Stations. Each police station is in charge of a Station House Officer of the rank of Inspector and to every such police station are attached a number of Sub-Inspectors, Asstt. Sub-Inspectors, Head Constables and Constables. From the census figures of 1941 it appears that the Union Territory had a population of 9,17,939 while the city of Delhi had a population of 6,95,686. There was a rapid escalation in the population following partition of India and independence. The census figures of 1951, 1961, 1971 and 1981 are given below:
The Sikh population in Delhi suddenly increased following the partition of the country and as per the 1981 census, the Sikh population of Delhi was 3,93,921 which works out to 6.33% of the total population of Delhi . The urban area has in recent years greatly spread out . Many outlying villages have come into the urban belt . Though there has been a swift rise in the population as also in the territorial belt and with urbanisation , criminal activity has increased and need for police control has also become more and more pressing , commensurate expansion of the police is said to have not taken place. There exists acute problem of residential accommodation within the urban area though with development activity to build more of accommodation the city's urban canvas has expanded and lots of new accommodation have been and are coming up . Since building activity is not commensurate , even people belonging to the middle income groups do not find residential accommodation for themselves . Thousands of people come to Delhi in search of employment . The acute shortage of accommodation has led to the appearance of jhuggis in and around all possible places . Notwithstanding constant vigil exercised by the Delhi Development Authority as also the Municipal Corporation , unauthorised constructions come up every now and then and Jhuggies in due course get regularised as authorised colonies . The existence of jhuggis with their poverty striken and underfed people in close proximity of multi-storeyed modern fashionable buildings with the rich section of the society often gives rise to peculiar problems. Incompatibility in the living process between the two classes of people brings about in the poor section a sense of frustration and generates a sense of hatred as also a lust for the property of the well-to-do. In recent years respect for human life has been fast vanishing. Fear of, and regard for, law are also reduced. Moral convictions have perished. There is, therefore, anxiety to avail every opportunity by the jhuggi dwellers to cut the rich to size. For more than a decade there has been consistent demand for augmenting the police force of Delhi. When the Delhi Police Act, 1978 was enacted to build up a vitalised police force the demand was examined in departmental records and a good number of conferences and debated as a basic issue. There was, however, no positive outcome of these exercises. In recent years, in and around Delhi, there has been sizeable growth of industrial activity. Industrialisation has brought about increase of industrial labour and with it has come more of criminal activity. The criminal population within Delhi has also been on the increase day by day. Hardly a day passes free from criminal incidents. Broad daylight looting of Banks, killing of men, stabbing of persons, burning of brides, commission of suicides and a wide range of other criminal activities appear to have become a part of the daily normal routine of life in this region. There used to be regular police beats which on account of pressure of work have been abandoned for some time. (B) Incidents (i) October 31, 1984: Around 9.20 a.m., two Sikh security guards fired upon Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi at 1, Safdarjung Road, her official residence. She was hurriedly removed to the All India Institute of Medical Sciences for medical attention. This information spread like wild fire. Thousands of residents of Delhi started gathering at the AIIMS. By the time the Commissioner of Police reached the AIIMS at 10.05 a.m. , the crowd was swelling up on the Aurobindo Marg outside AIIMS and the South District Police under the Deputy Commissioner of Police had become busy making arrangements to keep the AIIMS Complex clear and free. By 1 p.m. the crowd at the AIIMS had swelled up to well above 30,000. The exact condition of Smt. Gandhi was not being disclosed to the mob which was gradually becoming impatient. By the afternoon the newspapers, however, started publicising that Smt. Gandhi had succumbed to her injuries and doctors had failed to resuscitate her to life. CJC asked for production of certain newspapers which the Commission directed to be called for. References to some of them are made here. The Indian Express Editor has informed the Commission in answer to an interrogatory suggested by CJC:
The Statesman in answer to the interrogatory has replied:
A Special edition was brought out at about 3.15 p.m. announcing of Smt. Gandhi's assassination. Between 2 and 3 in the afternoon sporadic incidents started taking place. Initially these were confined to shouting of slogans against the Sikhs calling them as traitors, pulling out Sikh passengers from buses and manhandling them. Additional Commissioner of Police Jatav says, by 2.30 p.m. he received information of trouble in South Delhi of pelting of stones and assault on Sikhs. Police Commissioner Tandon has stated that around 12.30 p.m. he had been called to the Prime Minister's residence by M/s Fotedar and V.S. Tripathi. There the Lt. Governor was also present. He was advised to look after the security and to keep the roads around the Prime Minister's residence clear. At that point of time it was felt that the body of the Prime Minister would be brought from the AIIMS to her residence. Around 4 p.m. Police Commissioner Tandon was told that there would be delay in release of the body. Shri Rajiv Gandhi was then away in West Bengal and appears to have returned to Delhi in the later half of the afternoon. By about 5.30 p.m. the President who was away from India returned and straight drove to the AIIMS from Palam. The Presidential cavalcade appears to have been attacked by some persons out of the angry mob still waiting at the AIIMS and some of the vehicles were damaged by throw of stones. Around that time trouble started in Jorbagh and INA Market areas. Vehicles of Sikhs started being stopped and their turbans were removed and set on fire. By the evening time mobs collected at several places had started stopping transport vehicles as also scooters, motor-cycles and cars either driven by Sikhs or in which Sikhs were found travelling. The initial shout of condemnation of Sikhs began to take a serious turn. Some of the mobs were only of hoodlums, others were groups of people of different ages. By the evening from different areas several reports of taxis and transport vehicles of Sikhs being set on fire started pouring in. It is a fact that the Press Trust of India had sent the following message at 10.54 hours on that day:
When in the evening news of her death was published, the fact that assailants were Sikh guards was stated. During the night the crowds increased and started moving from place to place. The houses owned/occupied by Sikhs were identified. Free and open threats were administered to members of that community wherever they were found. Several incidents of brutal physical assault took place. Soon after the occurrence in the morning the Home Secretary had issued wireless messages to all the States, including the Delhi Administration , alerting them against apprehended trouble. On the basis of such alert, Additional Commissioner of Police, Shri R.K. Ohri ¸had sent out wireless messages to all Distt.Deputy Commissioners of Police to the following effect:
The then Home Secretary, Shri M .M .K. Wali has told the Commission that between 11 and 11.30 a.m. of that day he had talked to the Lt. Governor as also the Commissioner of Police to ensure that the situation should be watched with great care and caution. It appears from his evidence that the Home Minister, the Cabinet Secretary and the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister were away from Delhi at that time. These people returned to the capital between 3 and 3.30 p.m. This statement of the then Home Secretary has been supported by Lt. Governor Gavai. Police Commissioner Tandon has stated that in his opinion prohibitory orders under section 144, Cr. P.C. were adequate to meet the situation as it prevailed on October 31, 1984, and he, therefore, did not take any other action excepting promulgation of prohibitory orders and asking for deployment of the police force to enforce it. There were as many as 119 incidents on October 31, 1984 , to which reference has been made before the Commission. These happened in different parts of Delhi and were of the nature and pattern already indicated. Several affidavits filed before the Commission refer to these incidents. For instance, a reference to the affidavits of Smt. Ravinder Kaur (no. 2778) goes to show that her husband who was driving truck No. 755 was killed in Shahdara area during the night of October 31, 1984. The death certificate appended to the affidavit shows that the killing took place near a petrol pump in Bhajanpura area in the early morning hours of November 1, 1984. This clearly indicates that killing of people had started during the night of October 31, 1984, as found by the Commission. From the evidence produced it appears that 13 Gurudwaras were attacked on 31st October , being Shri Guru Singh Sabha Gurudwara at Naraina, the Gurudwara at Sagarpur, Shri Guru Singh Sabha Gurudwara at Lajpat Nagar, the Gurudwara at Sheikh Sarai, the Gurudwara at Defence Colony, the Gurudwara at Gandhi Nagar, Kalgidhar Singh Sabha Gurudwara at R.K.Puram, Shri Guru Singh Sabha Gurudwara at R.K.Puram, Shri Guru Singh Sabha Gurudwara at Sarojini Nagar, Shri Guru Singh Sabha Gurudwara at Lodhi Colony, Baba Budha Singh Gurudwara at Prem Nagar and Gurudwara Sikh Sangat at Green Park Extension, South Delhi. The material on record shows that attack on these Gurudwaras started by sunset time and continued till about 11 p.m. These incidents of October 31, 1984 appear to have been taken by way of involuntary reaction of a deep sense of grief, anguish and hatred for the assassins. There can be no scope to contend, and much less to accept, that at the initial stage on October 31, 1984, the violence that took place was organised. October 31, 1984, began with a usual autumn morning and no one had any reason to apprehend that such an ugly and unfortunate incident would take place. The killing came as a bolt from the blue and took everyone unawares. Smt. Gandhi's body had been received at the AIIMS and the fact that she was dead had not been disclosed. Though some people knew that she was dead, most of the population living in different areas has not come to know of the fact of death till evening. It is in such a background that the initial incidents started taking place. These, therefore, appear to the Commission to be spontaneous reaction of the people to the then prevailing situation at the commencement but as the police did not attend to the situation and failed to make a proper assessment of what was brewing, what began as an innocent reaction to Smt. Gandhi's assassination developed into one of the darkest tragedies in independent India's history. In the Evening News of the Hindustan Times of the 31st , the situation of that morning was thus described:
At the offices of the Delhi Pradesh Congress (I) Committee on Kali Bari Marg and the Delhi Pradesh Youth Congress (I) office on the Talkatora Road downcast workers sat on the lawns. The All India Congress (I) Committee office on Akbar Road was placed under close guard and all visitors were being screened closely. On Bahadur Shah Zafar Marg, where most newspaper offices are located , one could see people wiping tears on reading this. Simultaneously the capital was overtaken with grief. Many, however, still could not believe this. ' How is it possible ?' asked an elderly lady, 'only yesterday Indira Gandhi was in Orissa , I saw her on the television addressing the jawans.' But as the sun set and darkness descended on the city, a pall of gloom covered the city and perhaps the country completely. People now began to believe that Indira Gandhi was dead." The same newspaper carried the following news dated 31-10-1984:
This is a long extract of the news item from the Indian Express dated November 1, 1984. Indisputably the contents were printed in course of the night of the 1st October and this newspaper was available for sale/distribution by early morning of November 1, 1984. CJC called for copies of this newspaper from 1-11-8 to 7-11-84 and upon orders by the Commission, the management produced them along with their letter dated 18-11-1985. The news item was a contemporaneous publication and chances of motivated reporting would not be there. CJC with the obvious intention of relying on the news coverage called for these issues of the paper. The news shows in clearest terms that rioting in the proper sense has started in a very big way in several parts of the city on the 31st evening and except for killing which came into the process from 1-11-1984, every other form of attack on Sikhs had begun. The massive scale on which the operation had started so soon after the fact of death was circulated is clearly indicative of the fact that it was the spontaneous reaction of the people at large. The short span of time that intervened would not have permitted scope for any organising to be done. The gloom that had spread and affected the Congress-men in particular would not have permitted any such organisation to be handled. The reaction appears to have come as a flutter and sparked everywhere in a similar pattern. It was not confined to States where Congress (I) was in power. West Bengal and Tripura where C.P. (M) led governments were in office got affected too. The police was impotent from the very beginning has been clearly indicated. Their leadership was full of doubts about their capacity is also apparent. These facts have to be kept in view for drawing of appropriate conclusions at relevant places. (ii) November 1, 1984: On the previous day, apart from proclaiming prohibitory order under S.144, Cr. P. C. and directing the police to be on the alert and take such steps to meet the situation as may be necessary, no effective steps had been taken in the various localities where trouble had either started or was brewing or was likely to happen. The inaction of the police at the early stage gave a general impression that it was not going to interfere with the mob activities. In the early morning of November 1, 1984, mobs were found on the streets prepared to undertake looting, arson, assault and even kill. The Commission has already indicated that on October 31, 1984, itself operation had been undertaken to identify houses owned or occupied by Sikhs. The mobs that operated on November 1, 1984, were mostly from the lower strata of society coming from the jhuggis and the outlying villages. There were, however, several instances where people of the middle class as also some belonging to the richer section of the society did participate and even led the mobs. In many of the affidavits of the victims where the method and modality adopted by the mobs have been described, it has been clearly stated that there was a difference in the pattern of the operations carried in the morning and later in the day. In the morning hours crowds moved out and ordinarily threatened or terrorised the Sikh population in different areas, did small scale looting and even caused assaults. When these illegal activities were carried on by the mobs in certain areas there was resistance from the side of the Sikhs, particularly were they were of a sizeable number. The situation in many areas, therefore, became tense and provocative. In some areas while confrontation of this type proceeded and members of the Sikh community were beaten up, there had been casual retaliation. Assault on non-Sikh rioters inflicted by way of exercise of the right of self-defence was made an issue and was utilised to provoke the mobs against the Sikhs. From early morning a rumour was spread throughout Delhi to the effect that the Sikhs had poisoned the drinking water of Delhi. Obviously this had been done by the miscreants to create further bias and prejudice against the Sikhs and create apathy in the minds of the people against Sikhs. From that morning the miscreants also started spreading another rumour that every train which came from Punjab side carried dozens of dead bodies of non-Sikhs. This was an out and out lie but was intended to create the necessary panic and bring about the proper mood in the people constituting the mobs to react against the Sikhs. Rumour is one of the cheapest tools in the hands of the trouble makers either to boost or demoralise and the gangsters had resorted to such methods. Later in the day on November 1, 1984, the riotous mobs followed almost a uniform pattern everywhere. They came well armed with iron rods, crow-bars, kerosene in containers, inflammable powder, firearms, apart from lathis and other dangerous weapons. In some areas the kerosene stockists were made to supply kerosene. The afternoon operations became dreadful; the houses occupied by Sikhs were initially looted, the left over material which was either not considered useful for looting or was difficult to be removed was set on fire. Ordinarily, every male Sikh found in the house or in the locality was beaten to death. Wherever the gates of the compounds were closed or the doors were locked from within, with iron rods and crow-bars as also by use of force these were broken open. The riotous crowd followed the pattern of burning all the Sikhs who were either killed or were in the process of dying as a result of fatal assault and injuries. This obviously was so done to leave no trace and to make sure that no one that had been injured survived. The Commission has come across instances where ladies who ran to the rescue of their husbands or their close male relations were also brutally assaulted and in some cases were even thrown into the fire in which the men-folk were already being burnt. November 1, 1984, appears to have been the worst day during the riots. When the incidents happened in the early part of the day within a few kilometer from the Police Headquarters and in areas close to the administrative establishments, these incidents had not impressed the machinery that the situation had gone out of control. The Lt. Governor came to Teenmurti Bhavan around 6.35 a.m. where the dead body of the late prime Minister was lying in state. After making floral offering he looked for the Police Commissioner and when they met, he advised that the Police Commissioner instead of hanging around Teenmurti Bhavan should move out as there was apprehension of trouble, When the Lt. Governor suggested that the Army could be called immediately, the Commissioner of Police was of the view that he should first take a round, form his own opinion and then only on the basis of his assessment the decision for calling in the Army should be taken. Around 10 a.m. the Police Commissioner informed the Lt. Governor on telephone that the situation was going from bad to worst and that Army help should be asked for. When the Lt. Governor contacted the GOC, Delhi Area, according to the Lt. Governor the GOC replied that he had already been alerted but before the Army could move in he wanted a meeting with the Lt. Governor. The meeting took place around 1 p.m. The GOC was of the view that the number of troops available with him could operate only in two contiguous areas. The Army was ultimately asked to move into South and Central Delhi and it appears that it had become operational by the evening. Police Commissioner Tandon in his statement has also accepted the position that around 10 am after returning to the Police Headquarters he was of the view that the situation had become worse in several parts of the city. Addl. Commissioner Jatav has stated that until the evening of November 1 he had no occasion to feel that the situation was going out of control. There was no proper assessment by the police of the grave situation in the city. The Commission is satisfied from the material placed on record that on November 1, the law and order situation in Delhi had been left in the hands of the riotous mobs and the police, as will be presently discussed, failed to discharge its duty of maintaining law and order. It is during that night that one of the greatest tragedies of the riot period took place in the Trilokpuri area. Trilokpuri is part of Kalyanpuri Police Station. Block 32 of Trilokpuri was being inhabited by Labana Sikhs mostly belonging to the poorer section of society. In the earlier part of the day on November 1, an attempt was made to set the Gurudwara in Block 32 on fire but this attempt had been repelled by the local Sikh population. In the stone throwing that followed, a local mosque was somewhat damaged. In the afternoon the Station House Officer alongwith a police party had visited the area but made no proper appraisement of the situation nor did he attempt to normalise the situation by easing the tension. One Head Constable with two other police constables had been given duty from 8 a.m. till 8 p.m. that day but they withdrew from the area by 3 p.m. Trilokpuri had no light that night. Under the cover of darkness the riotous mob fell upon the Sikh community and almost wiped out everyone. 95 dead bodies were recovered from the locality. The few that survived were those who had run away under the cover of darkness and had taken shelter in huts of farm labourers from Bihar after shaving off their hair and beards. On November 1, 1984, in several other areas of the city hundreds of crimes were perpetrated by riotous mobs. Reference to 399 incidents of various categories has been made in the affidavits and evidence placed before the Commission. As already pointed out, this was the worst day during the period of rioting. Three fourths of the persons killed seem to have perished on this day alone in the hands of the rioters. There is clear evidence that a common pattern had been followed by big crowds. Curfew had been clamped in the afternoon. This power was available to be exercised by the Commissioner of Police. He stated that initially he did not think curfew to be necessary but later he instructed the Deputy Commissioners of Police to impose curfew when on their own assessment they were satisfied that the situation warranted it. There is clear material on record by way of admission of senior police officers in their evidence that curfew was not effective in as much as it could not be strictly enforced. Notwithstanding imposition of curfew, in the absence of any strict enforcement the crowds moved and operated as freely as before when there was no curfew. Throughout the night of November 1, 1984 the riotous mobs carried on their operations. The Army had not become very effective at the initial stages as it required magisterial orders for resorting to firing ; in the absence of proper guidance by officers used to the localities it had operational inconvenience; the mob taking advantage of the night and darkness in several areas used to keep away from the main roads and wider lanes as and when Army vehicles approached and once the vehicles moved away they collected to carry on their operations again. In the evening the Prime Minister and a number of opposition leaders made a joint appeal to the people for restoration of sanity and their appeal, inter alia stated:
(iii) November 2, 1984 As already noticed, towards the evening of November 1 the Army had moved into two Districts, namely, Central and South. One full Brigade reached Delhi at 6 a.m. on November 2, 1984, another at 8 a.m. and third one at 9 a.m., the fourth Brigade came at 1.15 p.m. and the fifth around 2.30 p.m. These five Brigades had come from Meerut, Roorkee, Shahjahanpur, Alwar and Punjab respectively, and each Brigade had at least 3,000 soldiers. By evening of November 2, 1984, the Army had moved into almost every area of Delhi. The presence of Army and regular patrolling made it difficult for the riotous mobs to freely operate but until evening there had been a lot of criminal activity carried on in almost every part of Delhi. The initial difficulty of lack of Magistrates was removed by providing more Magistrates. Instructions were issued to the Army to fire in self-defence or when mob committing arson, looting or resorting to killing was noticed. With the arrival of adequate force and the army moving about in almost every area, the situation showed signs of improvement. In the later part of the day on November 2, 1984, a group of Members of Parliament had met the Prime Minister at his residence. Lt. Governor Gavai also participated in the meeting. Notwithstanding the availability of the Army and round the clock movement of columns of it in affected areas, many incidents occurred during the day. The Prime Minister described the communal frenzy sweeping the country following the assassination as disgraceful. In an unscheduled brief broadcast to the nation he said:
The Prime Minister toured some of the affected areas between 1 a.m. and 4.30 a.m. to get a first hand account of the situation in the capital. (iv) November 3, 1984: From the evening of November 1, shifting of riot victims to Relief Camps had started in a small scale. On the November 2 that operation had been continued. By November 3, several Relief Camps had been set up and with the assistance of the Army, Police and the voluntary organisations as also the civil population the rescuing of riot victims continued and thousands of people from different areas came to life in different Relief Camps. With the Army units moving about, the morale of the victims started showing signs of improvement and some of the Sikhs who had run away from their houses for life started coming back to their own houses where they found all the property had been looted or removed and the houses had been set on fire. Most of the people lived in Camps for another 5-6 days and then started returning. From certain areas like Trilokpuri where mass killings had taken place the widows were not prepared to return to those areas and preferred to live in Relief Camps. Their habitation and living became a problem. By the evening of November 3, 1984 there was further improvement in the situation. (C) Consideration Of Affidavits Brief reference may be made to some of the affidavits relating to incidents of damage to Gurudwaras, killing, arson, looting and assault, and allegations of miscellaneous nature. The Commission had indicated on more than one occasion during the proceedings to counsel and parties that the manner of appreciating evidence collected by it would not be as done in a criminal trial and every detail in every affidavit was not to be taken into account to find out whether there was any contradiction and on that account to discard affidavits. The Commission was interested in collecting evidence to ascertain the pattern of the occurrences and for that purpose to have a general view of acceptable material on record. It is proposed to refer to some of the affidavits relating to the incidents for the aforesaid purpose. S. Amrik Singh (no. 2301) was living in West Patel Nagar (Central Distt.). In his affidavit he indicated:
It was an incident of November 1, 1984. S. Angad Singh (no. 2675) of Rohtak Road (North Delhi) had also referred to an incident of November 1, 1984, with reference to the Gurudwara of his locality. He has stated:
S. Ajit Singh (no. 2599) residing at Geeta Colony of Krishna Nagar Police Station (East Distt.) has referred to the Derababa Jai Singh Gurudwara. According to him the mob burnt the Gurudwara as a result of which the entire place was damaged. S. Charanjit Singh (no.2282) was residing in Lajpat Nagar (South Distt.). On November 1, 1984, according to him, "at about 10 a.m. a violent mob came to the Gurudwara from the Ring Road side. I was at home and was told all about it by Sewadar Mehel Singh who along with his family and the Granthi S. Tarsem Singh was residing in the rooms of the Gurudwara. There was noise outside the gurudwara . Hearing this noise the Sewadar and the Granthi came out but they were requested by the police to go inside and were told that the police would protect the Gurudwara as also them. When they went inside their rooms the mob comprising of 1200 to 1500 came near and started throwing stones. The mob was armed with petrol cans, sariyas, lathis etc. They collected the durries and the mob put them on fire. They went upstairs in the main hall and broke the glass door. They also burnt the holy books, Guru Granth Sahib and threw some of them. They closed the door of the room of the Sewadar and put it on fire. He was saved by the Hindu neighbours and shopkeepers." He has further stated:
In the affidavit of S. Gurcharan Singh (no. 2274), living in Punjabi Bagh area (West Distt.) it has been stated:
These representative affidavits indicate the manner in which the Gurudwaras were attacked. The fact that local Hindus protected the Sikh residents as also their Gurudwaras from the onslaught of the riotous mobs in some areas is indicative of the fact that the Hindus as such were not out to damage properties or make an attack on the lives of the Sikhs. It would, therefore, not be correct to say that Hindus as a community carried the attack against the Sikhs, their properties and their places of worship. Many Hindus, as found by the Commission elsewhere, extended every possible help, even at considerable risk to themselves, to protect the Sikh interest. It is, however, a fact that people who constitute the anti-social element among the Hindus as also some other communities other than Sikhs had participated in the riots. From the manner of operations carried in the Gurudwaras it is patent that the real eye was on the property available to be taken away from the Gurudwaras and simultaneously an attempt was made to damage the Gurudwaras after defiling the sacred books within them. Coming to incidents of killing, reference may be made to a few of the sample affidavits placed before the Commission. In the affidavit of Balwinder Singh (no. 2331), resident of Basti Sarai Rohilla within North Delhi, he has said:
The young man threw away his burning clothes and started running. He was hospitalised where he succumbed to the burns on November 2, 1984. It may be pointed out that in this affidavit reference to firing by the jawans of the RPF has been made. According to the deponent, in an unprovoked way the firing started and continued until the rioters had entered into the Gurudwara. The deponent appeared before the Commission as a witness and has supported the same story. Affidavit of Smt. Prakash Kaur, residing in the Slum Tenement of Garhi (no. 2340) narrates the killing operations thus:
Yet another incident of killing is available from the affidavit of Smt. Manmohini Kaur of Mahavir Enclave, Palam Road (no. 2378). It says:
One more instance of killing is very pathetically described in the affidavit of Smt. Padmi Kaur (no. 2497), living in Sultan Puri area. The incident also took place on November 1, 1984, and she narrates:
Another description of killing is available in the affidavit of Amrit Kaur (no. 2630), resident of Mangolpuri area where the incident took place on November 3,1984. She states:
The last of these representative affidavits relating to killing is of Jogi Singh (no. 2367) from Kalyan puri area where the incident is said to have taken place on November 1, 1984. He narrates:
Shri Gurcharan Singh (no. 2706) resident of Lajpat Nagar area, presented a case of arson and looting. He stated:
This deponent was cross-examined by the Delhi Administration at length and nothing substantial has come out in cross-examination to take away the effect of his affidavit. Some allegation of molestation of young ladies has been made in a few affidavits. None of the deponents who was cross examined adverted to this aspect. The Investigating Agency did pursue this matter but no evidence of dependable nature could be obtained. The Commission, keeping in view the quality of the people involved in the operations, would not have been surprised to come across a few incidents of this type. An analytical break-up of the affidavits filed by the victims with reference to various types of incidents police-station wise has been prepared by the Commission. Similarly, the affidavits have been classified on the basis of date-wise incidents referred to therein. These are available in Volume II at pp. 4 -11, Appendix 3 of the Report. Grievance has been made that even when the injured were taken to hospitals, at certain places doctors were not available; at others proper treatment was not provided and at yet others indifference was shown. Doctors belong to one of the noblest professions in the community and their professional discipline requires them to save every human life and make all possible attempts to relieve the suffering without bothering about caste or community , status or situation of the patient. Indian doctors with their high spirit and tradition could not have allowed themselves to be obsessed by the thought that two guards of the Sikh community had murdered the democratically chosen leader of their great polity. There is assertion that some incidents continued to happen even after the 3rd November but the commission is of the view that the riots had ended by that date and whatever happened thereafter was of the stray type and could not be taken to be a part of the riots. The conclusions of the Investigating Agency in respect of thirty incidents investigated by it are available in Vol. II Appendix 4, pages 12-18. (D) Role Played By The Railway Administration At the instance of the victims, the Northern Railway was called upon to produce certain documents and answer certain interrogatories. Prof. Madhu Dandvate, who was and also is now a Member of Parliament, was travelling by the Rajdhani Express from Bombay to Delhi on November 1, 1984. He filed an affidavti (no. 2641) and was also cross examiend. He has, in his affidavit, stated:
He further stated in the affidavit that he discovered at least 3 more dead bodies of Sikhs lying in various compartments. He was of the view that " the murders of the Sikhs and burning of their dead bodies at the Tughlakabad Station could have been definitely prevented if police at the station were not to remain passive spectators of the gruesome acts of the hooligans who had come from outside the station." His affidavit and his statemement in cross examination make it clear that at Mathura which is in the State of Uttar Pradesh, the Commandos and the police parties were ready for action when the train came on the platform. He himself stated that the situation at Tughlakabad was very different. In his reply to a question by the Commission he stated:
The evidence given by Prof. Dandvate makes several aspects clear. At Mathura advance care had been taken before the train came on to the platform to ensure that nothing went wrong while at Tughlakabad which is within the Union Territory of Delhi no such arrangement was made and the police became silent spectators when the murders took place. Nothing has been brought out in the cross examination of Prof. Dandvate to discard his affdavit. The Commission take note of the fact that Prof. Dandvate is a Member of Parliament and was once upon a time Minister for Railways and there is absolutely no justification to disbelieve his evidence. Seven First Information Reports available on record have been taken note of in the written arguments of DSGMC. Many of these are by Railway employees. FIR 355/84 is dated November 1, 1984 and appears to have been lodged at 12.30 p.m. The informant is one Rameshwar Dayal, Booking Clerk at Tughlakabad Railway Station. The exact narration is thus:
FIR No. 357 on 2-11-84 lodged at 10 a.m. was by the Guard of 25 Dn. Bombay-Amritsar Deluxe. This train for want of signal clearance was forced to stop at Tughlakabad Railway Station. It was alleged that 2000 men surrounded the train, removed its hosepipes and made it immobile. The men armed with lathis, sticks and iron rods pulled out the Sikh passengers, thrashed them mercilessly and set them on fire. When the police came the mob ran away. The train left Tughlakabad around 1.27 p.m. and reached Delhi at 2.05 p.m. 8 dead bodies were recovered at that place from the compartments. FIR No. 356 lodged at the New Delhi Railway Station at 7 a.m. on 2-11-84 on the basis of a memo sent by the Asstt. Station Master, Delhi Kishanganj with reference to the incident at Nangloi Railway Station, reads thus:
It is clear from these as also the other FIRs where similar allegations have been made that no arrangements were made for protecting the passengers either in running trains or when trains stopped at Railway Stations - being authorised or unauthorised stoppages. If proper care had been taken and the police had remained active and played even the normal role of policemen, as Prof. Dandvate has told the Commission, nothing untoward was likely to have happened. The Commission takes note of the difference in the arrangements at Mathura Junction in UP and different stations within the Union Territory of Delhi. Whether it be RPF, Govt. Railway Police or Delhi Police, all appear to have become indifferent within the Union Territory. From the answer to the interrogatories given by the Railway Administration it is clear that 46 trains were forced to make unauthorised halts either at Railway Stations where such trains had no stoppage or outside station areas. Some of these trains were long distance ones while others were local trains. It appears that armed men came by these trains and moved into Delhi. At convenient places they got down within the Union Territory to carry on riotous activities by stopping those trains. Obviously, when information spread that riots were taking place in Delhi, disturbed conditions prevailed, lot of looted property was available; gangsters from outside got attracted, found the situation inviting and moved into the city. The Railway Administration has also given information that hundreds of Delhi bound trains were cancelled/terminated at different places - station or otherwise- during the riots. From the dates given in regard to the unauthorised stoppage of trains and the termination of trains it is clear that unauthorised stoppages took place on 1-11-84 and a small part of the 2nd. Cancellation/termination of train services in regard to several trains was done from 2nd afternoon. What was done on 2nd afternoon should possibly have been done from 1st afternoon because by then on account of the proximity of the Headquarters, the Railway authorities should have come to know as to exactly what was happening. The claim of the Railway authorities that the RPF handled the situation properly and rose to the occasion does not appear to be a fact. If the RPF along with local police had worked properly these events would not have happened. The protection provided with the intervention of Prof. Dandvate should have been provided in the trains operating from 31st afternoon without being asked for. In that event also these casualties would not have happened. This appears to be a case of negligence and want of assessment of the situation on the part of the Railway Administration. (E) Death At Delhi The Government disclosure in Parliament took the number of killings at Delhi to 2146. Before the Commission the Delhi Administration filed a list of persons upon whose death payment of compensation had been admitted and given to the next of kin. The number of such persons was disclosed as 2212. The Commission called upon the parties-victims as also the Administration-to produce a detailed list of persons killed during the riots. Several extensions were given to both sides. It is only when the Commission insisted that the list should be filed and no extension would be granted and if necessary adverse inference would be drawn, the CJC filed a list on March 31, 1986 showing the total number of deaths to be 3870. The Delhi Administration later filed a statement before the Commission admitting the number of deaths during the riots to be 2307. Between the initial disclosure of deaths in Delhi as made in Parliament and latest figure give by the Delhi Administration , there is a difference of 161. At the foot of the list supplied by the CJC there has been a little arithmetical exercise. The grand total has been shown as 3949 out of which there has been a deduction of 149 on the ground of duplication and again 70 names have been added. This is how the figure of 3870 has been reached. There still appears to be an arithmetical error in the totalling of the number. The correct number should be 3874. A copy of the list supplied by the CJC was made over to the Delhi Administration with a direction that the same may be checked up and comments as to its correctness or acceptability should be filed. In compliance with the direction Delhi Administration has filed its comments along with an affidavit of Shri Bhatia, Joint Secretary (Home). The First Information Reports in regard to killings at Delhi put the figure at 1419. As already stated, the Deputy Commissioner of Delhi who had verified the claims has later accepted the number of deaths to be 2307. On a comparative basis of the names disclosed in the FIRs and in the Deputy Commissioner's list, 315 persons whose names appear in the FIRs do not figure in the Deputy Commissioner's list. The list given by the CJ C does not contain full names and all the required particulars for identification. In certain cases, for instance in respect of Delhi Cantt. Police Station, the total number of deaths has been shown to be 368 but as a fact only 320 names have been given. Thus there is no mention of any name for the remaining 48 persons. Again in the list relating to Police Station Tilak Nagar where deaths have been shown to be of 67 persons, only 62 names have been disclosed. Reference to these two Police Stations is illustrative. Possibly, the Committee may not be blamed for this situation. In fact, a clear cut investigation into this aspect of the inquiry is not easy. On the basis of the affidavits the Commission made an attempt to collect the number of deaths but that again appeared to be both difficult as also misleading. In many affidavits names of the killed have not been specified. There are several affidavits which refer to the same deaths. Again, many deaths are not covered by any affidavits. In such a situation affidavits do not provide a sound basis for determining the number of people killed during the riots. It is in evidence that hundreds of the people so killed were burnt while they were half dead or while they were in an unconscious state or had already died. The DSGMC has specified in written arguments names of 73 people who were burnt alive, 7 who were burnt after they had become unconscious and 13 persons who were burnt after they have died. There is evidence that hundreds of charred bodies were recovered. These obviously and also those that had been burnt were not subjected to postmortem. If postmortem on other dead bodies had been made the postmortem figure itself would have provided a sound basis for determining the number of dead people. It is a fact that Delhi has a lot of floating population and hundreds of Sikh people from Punjab keep visiting Delhi every now and then on account of proximately and business activities, sight-seeing and other family necessities. There have been many affidavits before the Commission where reference to such visiting, guests to have been affected during the riots has been made. Similarly, every now and then a number of regular residents of Delhi go over to Punjab . On the basis of ration cards where the total number of members of every card holder family is indicated, proper calculation cannot be made because there are several people residing in Delhi who are not card holders. There are ghost ration cards in existence and ration cards also do not reflect the exact number of people in the family. Many people who had gone over to Punjab did not return soon after the riots on account of the continuing disturbed conditions. All these circumstances have made the inquiry for ascertaining the definite number of people who died difficult. The number has , however, to be somewhere between 3870 (arithmetically corrected to be 3874) and 2307 -- the higher figure coming from the Committee and the lower figure having been admitted by the Delhi Administration. Placed in this situation , the Commission has not endeavoured to ascertain the exact number of people who died during the riots. Simultaneously, it is a fact that the matter cannot be taken as concluded until the exact number is ascertained by a further inquiry. Death gives rise to definite consequences and brings in certain considerations. As already found, the next of kin become entitled to a compensation of Rs. 20,000; the recommendations of the Commission may bring about certain other benefits, and if there be a widow or dependent relations left behind, she is or they are entitled to certain advantages. It is quite likely that in some cases the next of kin may not have come forward to raise a claim on the basis of death. The manner in which the Delhi Administrat ion has been changing the figure by conceding the claim leads the Commission to accept the position that if there be a further probe and of a closer type, it is quite likely that the number may increase. Keeping these aspects in view the Commission recommends that instead of accepting a definite number as the final list, the matter should be kept open for further examination where the number shall not go below 2307 and may not go beyond 3874. But in between the exact number should be ascertained. The modality for ascertaining this should be by the appointment of an officer with full powers to go into the matter and he should give public notice to invite claims of death within the Union Territory of Delhi during the period of riots (October 31 to Novermber 7, 1984) by fixing a time for raising of claims and also a date for finalising the same in accordance with a procedure behoving the rules of natural justice and the figure should be determined. As and when any new name is added to the already accepted list of 2307 by the Delhi Administration, the benefits contemplated in respect of the dead people should be extended to the next of kin. Since delay might make the inquiry not beneficial the modality proposed in the recommendation may be implemented without delay and a time-frame should be prescribed. |
